Cartas sobre a mesa: a correlaçâo de forças, as negociações de paz, e o futuro da guerra na ucrânia
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26792/rbed.v13i1.75513Palavras-chave:
Guerra russo-ucraniana, Correlação de forças militares, Negociações de paz, RealismoResumo
Este artigo propõe uma análise de conjuntura do conflito russo-ucraniano, que chega em 2026 ao seu quinto ano. Propõe-se responder à seguinte pergunta: qual é o prognóstico de curto prazo para o término da guerra na Ucrânia, considerando a correlação de forças entre os beligerantes, seus objetivos estratégicos e o estado das negociações diplomáticas? Compreendendo a guerra como um meio para atingir fins políticos, argumenta-se que a Rússia possui uma teoria de vitória factível, enquanto a Ucrânia encontra-se em uma posição de crescente dificuldade. A correlação militar indica vantagens russas em domínios centrais de uma guerra de atrito: capital humano, artilharia, poder aéreo e uma base industrial de defesa capaz de sustentar as demandas do campo de batalha. Por ainda não ter conseguido atingir tais objetivos, Putin tem incentivos para manter seu curso de ação e não acatar um cessar-fogo. Do ponto de vista negocial, Kiev encontra-se em uma posição de barganha enfraquecida devido a reveses no campo de batalha e à pressão externa, especialmente dos Estados Unidos. No entanto, considera-se que um acordo de paz no curto prazo é improvável, devido às posições maximalistas e incompatíveis de ambos os atores, somadas à desconfiança e à relutância em realizarem concessões.
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